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Abstract
Cash holding decision is a very crucial decision that strongly affects the performance 
of an organization. Corporate dynamism as a corporate governance tool was explored 
in this study in order to establish its relationship with cash holding decision in listed 
manufacturing companies in Nigeria. Board skill, female leadership, foreign directors, 
board ownership and directors’ compensation were used as proxies for corporate dyna-
mism. A panel regression model was adopted in this study to examine the implication 
of corporate dynamism on cash holding decisions spanning six years from 2012 to 
2017. Random sampling technique was employed in order to arrive at thirty firms out 
of thirty-seven listed manufacturing firms, which comprised industrial and consumer 
goods sector. Board ownership and the existence of foreign expatriates were found 
to have a significant effect on cash holding decisions. It is concluded that directors 
with significant holdings tend to be more aggressive towards activities that enhance 
the performance of a firm, one of which is ensuring that optimal level of cash is held 
at a particular point in time in order to guide against liquidity problems, which may 
be caused by overtrading or even keeping excess idle cash, which is supposed to be 
invested in profitable ventures. Also, the fact that the existence of foreign expatriates 
will affect cash holding decisions, which may be justified by the fact foreign expatriates 
are displaying expertise because of diverse experience that they have been able to gain 
from different parts of the world.
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INTRODUCTION
The decision of cash holding is very germane to the survival and 
growth of a firm, and a growing literature has emerged recently to 
explain the implication and determinants on firms. In the developed 
economy, a recent report by Deloitte shows that there has been an 
increase in cash holdings over the past three decades. For example, 
in the United States, Han and Box (2017) assert that US firms ac-
count for $5 trillion in cash holdings between 1990 and 2000. This 
amounts to 10% of the annual gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
US. Subsequently, Alam (2010) opined that Japanese firms hold $2.1 
trillion in cash, which amounts to 44% of their GDP. For Korean 
firms, similar figures were recorded by Mosavi, Karimipoua, Zarei, 
and Heidari (2015) who highlight that $4.4 billion was withheld 
by Korean firms in cash and this is equal to 34% of their GDP. The 
aforementioned numbers signify that cash holdings decisions are 
important to every corporate organization. 
However, this decision is highly influenced by the board of directors 
(top-level management). They are responsible for determining the 
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amount of cash that is to be retained or withheld by the firm within a financial period (Kuan, Li, & Chu, 
2011). The competence of the board is of the utmost importance in addressing and justifying cash re-
serves. One of the underlying assumptions when preparing financial statements of every firm is going 
concern. It’s expected of every organization to be seen as a going concern. Cash is very important to the 
going concern of the firm. This is very crucial to the going concern of the firm reason being that cash 
and cash equivalent are liquid assets meant to increase shareholders value by investing in profitable 
engagements, drastically minimize cost, and the peculiarity of cash not overlooked. Hence, the agent 
(top-level managers) saddled with this responsibility need to be equipped on how to make informed and 
timely decisions in cash management (Sunden & Surette, 1998). 
There has been a dichotomy in theories; Santosuosso (2015) noted that the pecking order theory as-
sumes that agent (managers) act in the best interest of their principal (shareholders). It’s believed that 
the agency conflict (conflict of interest) is absent under this theory. This suggests that managers are al-
lowed to hold cash in the company and use for profitable investments. This is in line with the pecking or-
der theory that internal resources should be considered before external resource (Orens & Reheul, 2013; 
Scordis et al., 2017). On the flip side, Connor and Yaghoubi (2016) opined that free cash flow theory and 
agency theory highlights that agency conflicts arise noting that managers don’t always act in the best 
interest of the shareholders due to their own personal benefit. They act in their own personal profiting 
rather than increasing the wealth of the shareholders. Based on this premise, there is a fear that when 
an agent (managers) holds too much cash, they might mismanage the fund and leads to agency problem 
(Al Zararee & Al-Azzawi, 2014).
However, this study is based on agency theory. Agency theory is one of the most frequently adopted 
theoretical frameworks by finance and economics researchers in understanding the linkage between 
cash holding decisions and corporate governance variables. The existence of agency theory is based on 
the relationship between principals (shareholders) and agents (board members), which arise as a result 
of separation in ownership and control of a business enterprise, such that these shareholders appoint 
the board members to ensure the creation of a disciplined atmosphere, setting of timely and achievable 
strategic plan, and the effective control of the management team, thereby ensuring firm performance, 
which will lead to maximization of shareholder’s value (Connor & Yaghoubi, 2016). In ensuring these, it 
is important for board members to ensure adequate management of company cash by investing it into 
profitable ventures. 
Subsequently, empirical review on the relationship between cash holdings and corporate governance 
that have focused on developed and developing economies is inconclusive. For example, in Belgium, 
Orens and Reheul (2013) examine the idiosyncratic manager specific influence on SMEs cash holdings; 
Amess, Banerji, and Lampousis (2015) consider the causes and consequence of corporate cash holdings 
in the United States; the Taiwan context (Kuan et al., 2011) examines the relationship between corporate 
governance and cash policy within family-controlled firms; the Vietnam context (Thi & Nhan, 2016) 
presents a review of cash holdings and corporate governance mechanisms and Al-Najjar and Clark 
(2017) explore the relationship amid cash holdings and internal, external governance mechanisms in 
Middle East and North African countries. However, there has been a dearth of literature in Nigerian 
economy. Against this conjuncture, this study aims to explore the influence a robust board has on man-
ufacturing firm’s decision to hold cash. 
The next section highlights literature review and hypotheses development, section 2 shows the method-
ological approach applied in this study, while section 3 presents the results and discussion of findings 
and finally conclusion and recommendations were provided in the last section.
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Several corporate governance attributes have 
been given attention in recent academic literature. 
Some of these attributes are board meeting fre-
quency (Eluyela et al., 2018a); foreign directorships 
(Ozordi, Uwuigbe, Teddy, Ikimapayi, & Gbenedio, 
2018); and board independence (Nadeem, Zaman, 
& Saleem, 2017). Despite these prior empirical 
studies on various board attributes, in this study, 
we examined five different variables that measure 
corporate dynamism in relation to cash holding 
decision. These are board skill, female leadership, 
foreign directors, board ownership and director 
compensation. 
1.1. Board skill and cash holding 
decision
The level of education, experience and exposure 
determines the skill board members acquire over 
time. The formal educational experience of CEO 
irrespective of any educational background affects 
the managerial decisions top executives make and 
ultimately has an effect on the value and surviv-
al of the firm (Kuan et al., 2011). Since cash hold-
ing decisions determine ultimately the survival 
of the firm, the risk associated with cash holding 
decisions is to be considered, in a bid to balance 
liquidity and profitability. Scordis et al. (2017) not-
ed that highly educated CEOs are less risk averse 
and have a better understanding of the cash im-
plications of various firm needs and investment 
opportunities that might be right for the firm in 
the market. They posit that they will be less con-
cerned about holding of cash. Hence, higher ed-
ucated CEOs are likely to spend their firm cash 
resources, managing firm cash needs effectively 
and taking profitable investment opportunities 
as compared to lower educated CEOs. Lower ed-
ucated CEOs will qualify for any CEO without 
a master’s degree or MBA (i.e. CEO with only 
first degree) (Amess et al., 2015). However, Jamil, 
Anwar, Afzaal, Tariq, and Asif (2016) posit that 
the decision of holding a well-structured cash 
system is not mainly influenced by board skill. 
This conflicting evidence in empirical literature 
leads us to the conjuncture that:
H01: There is no significant relationship between 
board skill and cash holding decisions in list-
ed manufacturing firms in Nigeria.
1.2. Female leadership and cash 
holding decision
In previous literature, the relationship between fe-
male leadership and cash holding remains incon-
clusive. We established two objectives functions 
or motive for female leadership, that is the agen-
cy cost motives and precautionary motives. From 
agency cost motive, when a woman is included 
in the board of directors, Hilgen (2015), Thi and 
Nhan (2016), believe that this will enhance the 
board effectiveness and monitoring quality there-
by increasing shareholders wealth, as well as in-
fluencing the organizations monitoring quali-
ty positively and the corporate board as a whole 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Also, the presence of fe-
male leadership helps organizations by connecting 
them with shareholders and making provision for 
legitimacy with respect to numerous stakeholders 
like employees, investors and so on (Lückerath-
Rovers, 2010). Another benefit of having a female 
leader on board is the reduction of opportunistic 
behavior of managers, which ultimately results in 
the elimination of agency cost. Alternatively, from 
the precautionary motives, previous research-
ers have noted that females tend to be more risk 
averse (Ahsan & Ullah, 2013) and less confident 
in the decision making process as compared to 
male board members (Bhagat & Obreja, 2012). 
Accordingly, board that are led by female directors 
do not make risky investment because of her risk 
appetite, which is in contrast to their male coun-
terparts who tend to make more confident thereby 
taking on riskier investments (Agnew et al., 2003; 
Barber & Odean, 2001; Barsky et al., 1997; Faccio 
et al, 2012; Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Sunden & 
Surette, 1998). For example, a study from (Huang 
& Kisgen, 2013) reveals that male executives tend 
to make more purchases and issuance of debt than 
female executives. They always want to play safe 
and take precautionary measures before diving 
into a new investment. Under this motive, it’s be-
lieved that there is no need for cash holding and 
that a negative relationship exists between female 
leadership and cash holding decision (Alam, 2010; 
Sabbadini & Lim, 2011). Against this conjuncture, 
we hypothesize that:
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H02: There is no significant association between 
female leadership and cash holding decisions 
in listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria.
1.3. Foreign directors and cash 
holding decision
The issue of the firm having a diverse board has 
been a consistent debate in recent finance litera-
ture (Nadeem, Zaman, & Saleem, 2017; Ozordi, 
Uwuigbe, Teddy, Tolulope, & Eyitomi, 2018). 
Diversity can be in age, gender, experience and 
nationalities. There has been several empirical ev-
idence on the presence of foreign directors and per-
formance, but few regarding cash holding decision. 
Peck-Ling et al. (2016) investigated the effect of for-
eign ownership and foreign directors on the profit-
ability of Malaysian listed companies between 1999 
and 2010. Using a sample of 348 Malaysian firms, 
the result shows that foreign equity ownership, the 
appointment of foreign chairman and foreign chief 
executive directors did not have a significant rela-
tionship with return on equity of the sampled firms. 
However, foreign directors on board have a signif-
icant effect on return on equity. Subsequently, in 
the Mexican context, Reyna (2017) found a positive 
relationship amidst the aforementioned constructs. 
However, Jeon and Ryoo (2013) and Benavides et al. 
(2016) found an insignificant association between 
foreign directors and dividend pay-out structure in 
India and Korea, respectively.
In this study, foreign directors are expatriates 
who have nationalities outside of Nigeria. Ozordi, 
Uwuigbe, Teddy, Tolulope, and Eyitomi (2018) are 
of the opinion that for a firm to acquire diverse 
skills, innovations and ideas, they should employ 
the services of expatriates from different parts of 
the world. Schoubben and Uytbergen (2014) pos-
it that experience, knowledge and skill of foreign 
board members will result in an effective and ef-
ficient cash holding decision in firms. However, 
Hilgen (2015) opined that whether foreign direc-
tors are present on board or not, cash holding de-
cisions are not significantly affected. Against this 
inconclusive result in empirics, the third hypothe-
sis is stated as follows:
H03: There is no significant relationship between 
foreign directors and cash holding decisions 
in listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria.
1.4. Board ownership and cash 
holding decision 
Prior literature on the relationship between board 
ownership and cash holding decision provides 
mixed evidence. Kuan et al. (2011) argued that 
there is a positive relationship between board own-
ership and cash holding decisions, this is because 
board with higher ownership percentage tends 
to lead to greater performance in organizations 
Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Lambert et al., 2007). Also, 
an increased director’s ownership stakes in the firm, 
managers are less likely to pursue activities that 
will result in value reduction for the company. They 
would be able to use their oversight power to ensure 
proper use of cash when making investment deci-
sions. Jamil, Anwar, Afzaal, Tariq, and Asif (2016) 
also found a similar result. On the other hand, if 
managers own a large share of their personal wealth 
in company’s shares, this might make managers 
risk averse when making investment decisions (Al-
Najjar & Clark, 2017; Amess et al., 2015). They argue 
that a negative relationship exists between board 
ownership and cash holding decision. Scordis et al. 
(2017) noted that the influence of board ownership 
on cash holding is U-shaped. Against this empirical 
evidence, we hypothesize as follows:
H04: There is no significant association between 
board ownership and cash holding decisions 
in listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria.
1.5. Director compensation and cash 
holding decision 
Beside board skill, female leadership, foreign direc-
tors and board ownership, the director compensa-
tion is also an important variable to consider. Liu 
and Mauer (2011) identified the main components 
of director compensation, which comprises of ba-
sic pay, bonus, pensions and other benefits in kind. 
Compensation serves as motivation and satisfaction 
for directors, which have a huge effect on firm value. 
Santosuosso (2015) points out that when the board 
of directors are highly paid, shareholders’ wealth 
is positively related. For organizations to bring out 
the best from the directors, they have to be provid-
ed with appropriate motivations and compensations 
(Frydman & Saks, 2010). Lambert et al.’s (1991) study 
shows that higher compensation results in greater 
amount of cash holding owing to the risk averse and 
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under-diversified it seems like here is missed some-
thing of the board. In this situation, the firms keep 
more cash to take all investment opportunities to in-
crease the firm value. This evidence above supports 
that the compensation the board of directors has an 
impact on the corporate cash holding level as they 
have a great influence on the liquidity of the firms 
(Liu & Mauer, 2011). For example, the study by Vo 
and Phan (2013) in Vietnam shows that the compen-
sation of the board of directors is also an important 
element that influences the organization’s operations. 
However, Eluyela et al. (2018b) noted that when di-
rectors are well compensated, it helps to reduce 
agency conflict. This conflict of interest may exist 
between CEOs and board of directors. The bonus 
scheme given to the director for achieving a certain 
level of performance also helps to reduce these con-
flicts. Directors will always strive to attain this level 
of performance in order to get the bonus, they will 
ensure that the company cash is well managed to-
wards attaining this level of performance expected 
from them. In order to solve this conflict, such a firm 
should not hold high level of cash (Fryman & Saks, 
2010). This is due to such firm having beyyer perfor-
mance and can simply borrow money from external 
parties like banks. Nevertheless, Kuan et al. (2011) 
noted that excess director compensation can lead 
to underperformance of firms. This is because the 
board does not wish to take all investment opportu-
nities in order to have a high level of cash reserve to 
obtain more compensation. Therefore, it needed to 
determine whether director compensation is signifi-
cantly associated with cash holding decision.
H05: There is no significant association between 
director compensation and cash holding 
decisions in listed manufacturing firms in 
Nigeria.
2. MATERIALS  
AND METHODS
In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, 
a sample of thirty firms was selected randomly 
from a population of thirty-seven manufactur-
ing firms in line with Krejcie and Morgan (1970), 
Uwalomwa, Olamide, and Francis (2015) who are 
of the opinion that 5% of a population is the min-
imum sample size expedient to make inferences 
on the entire population. Furthermore, the choice 
of this sector stems from the major contribution 
of the manufacturing firm to the growth of the 
economy (Asaleye, Adama, & Ogunjobi, 2018; 
Oladipo, Iyoha, Fakile, Asaleye, & Eluyela, 2019). 
However, the possible choice of thirty firms was 
necessitated by the availability and accessibility of 
data within the period under consideration from 
independent firms’ annual report. The annual 
report is the legitimate blueprint of any external 
and internal investor in making decisions. Hence, 
this report was explored to extract information 
on the explanatory construct (female leader-
ship, director compensation, foreign directors, 
board skill, board ownership) and the explained 
construct (cash holding decision), respectively. 
Spanning from 2012 to 2017 being six years was 
duly scrutinized under this study. The Hausman 
test was conducted to ascertain if the fixed effect 
model (FE) or random effect (RE) model panel re-
gression is ideal to explore the impact of corpo-
rate dynamism and cash holding decision on list-
ed manufacturing firm (Asaleye, Popoola, Lawal, 
Ogundipe, & Ezenwoke, 2018).
Table 1. Summary of variables
Variable Item (proxies) Measurement
Dependent Cash holdings decision (CHD)
Cash and cash equivalent 
divided by the book value of 
total assets
Independent
Female 
leadership (FL)
The proportion of female 
directors against total board 
members yearly
Director 
compensation 
(DCOM)
Directors fee annually
Foreign 
directors (FD)
The proportion of foreign 
directors on the board divided 
by the total number of 
directors on the board yearly
Board skill 
(BSKILL)
Proxied by the level of 
qualification on top level 
management (if they have 
a Dr or Prof on the board 1 
otherwise 0)
Board 
ownership 
(BOWN)
The percentage of directors’ 
shares against total compare 
share annually
Control
Board size 
(BSIZE) 
The numbers of directors on 
the board
Leverage (LEV) Annual liabilities to asset
Profitability 
(PROF)
Profit ascertained after tax 
annually
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2.1. Model specification
In this work, the model shown below was adapted 
from the work of Thi and Nhan (2018). The equa-
tion 1 is shown below:
( ), , , , .CHD f FL DCOM FD BSKILL BOWN=  (1)
When panel data properties were added, we have 
equation 2:
0 1 2
3 4 5 .
it it it
it it it it
CHD FL DCOM
FD BSKILL BOWN
β β β
β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + +
 (2)
After a critical review of literature, this study em-
ployed certain control and independent construct 
to the model, which was expressed in equation 3 
as follows:
0 1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8 ,
it it it
it it it
it it it it
CHD FL DCOM
FD BSKILL BOWN
BZISE LEV PROF
β β β
β β β
β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
 (3)
where itCHD  – cash and cash equivalent with re-
spect to firm-specific and time lag, itFL  – female 
leadership with respect to firm-specific and time 
lag, itDCOM  – director compensation with re-
spect to firm-specific and time lag, itFD  – foreign 
directors with respect to firm-specific and time lag, 
itBSKILL  – board skills with respect to firm-spe-
cific and time lag, itBOWN  – director share-
holdings with respect firm-specific and time lag, 
itBZISE  – board size with respect to firm-specific 
and time lag, itLEV  – debt obligation with respect 
to firm-specific and time lag, itPROF  – profit as-
certained with respect firm-specific and time lag, 
0β  – coefficients of parameter, itε  – error term, 
i  – sampled firms, t  – time trend.
3. RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSIONS
Table 2 illustrates the summary of the intercon-
nectivity amidst constructs. The decision to hold 
cash was explored from each sampled firms’ cash 
and cash equivalent balances in their annual 
reports clearly expressing each firm’s decision 
to hold cash and its equivalent. However, the 
summary shows a range of 1 % to 66% of these 
firm hold cash with an average mean of 9% sim-
ply buttressing the fact that firms do not real-
ly hold cash or cash equivalent in large quanti-
ty. Consequently, board skill (BSKILL), female 
leadership (FL), foreign directors (FD), direc-
tor ownership (DOWN), director compensation 
(DCOM), board size (BSIZE), leverage (LEV) and 
profitability (PROF) show a mean of 0.47, 0.24, 
0.35, 0.14, 7.9, 9.8, 0.55 and 0.07, which show that 
the sampled firm has a board size of a minimum 
of nine directors on the board with female oc-
cupying 25% and foreign directors at 35% and a 
well competent director with board skill of 47% 
on average. Furthermore, directors’ holdings of 
this sampled firm consist of 15% with compensa-
tion of 8 million naira on average with the firm’s 
profitability at 7% and a debt ratio at 55%.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018).
Variable CASH BSKILL FL FD DOWN DCOM BSIZE LEV PROF
Mean 0.0994 0.4762 0.24751 0.35320 0.14519 7.91018 9.80952 0.55344 0.07106
Median 0.0674 0 0.25 0.3529 0.0089 8.0554 9 0.53999 0.07162
Maximum 0.6632 1 0.75 0.7778 0.9113 9.8887 18 1.61924 0.53305
Minimum 0.0001 0 0 0 0 6.0631 4 0.17001 –0.6615
Std. dev. 0.10483 0.50114 0.14339 0.16861 0.23371 0.88392 2.85094 0.18998 0.10521
Skewness 2.15871 0.09534 0.37903 0.17220 1.62604 –0.17185 0.83021 1.32277 –1.7717
Kurtosis 9.22203 1.00909 3.34169 2.67705 4.6217 2.35512 3.54448 8.22803 21.2364
Jarque-Bera 351.292 24.5005 4.23491 1.36531 80.8859 3.27073 18.7022 210.278 2113.87
Probability 0 0.00005 0.12034 0.50527 0 0.19488 0.00008 0 0
Sum 14.6138 70 36.3836 51.9201 21.3433 1162.79 1442 81.3551 10.4450
Sum sq. dev. 1.60436 36.6666 3.00175 4.15050 7.97438 114.071 1186.66 5.26937 1.61599
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
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Table 3 depicts the correlation statistics on both 
constructs concurrently. It is a yardstick to attain 
if the data suffer any form of multicollinearity and 
to explore any possible association amid variables. 
However, the summary of this table proves that the 
correlation between construct does not exceed the 
80% threshold as inferred in Ozordi et al. (2018). 
Hence, it proves the absence of multicollinearity.
Table 4. Random effects – Hausman test
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018).
Correlated random effects – Hausman test
Equation: untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test summary Chi-sq. 
statistic
Chi-sq. 
d.f. Prob.
Cross-section 
random 6.680598 8 0.0415
Table 4 represents the predictability test on the 
appropriateness of what panel regression model 
to be employed under these specific rules: accept 
the alternate hypothesis (fixed effects model), if 
the p-value is statistically significant and accept 
the null hypothesis (random effects model) if the 
p-value isn’t statistically significant. However, it is 
evident in Table 4 above that the p-value (0.0415) 
< 5%, which implies the fixed effect model as the 
ideal yardstick for making the statistical decision. 
Table 5 depicts the holistic summary of the fixed 
effect model already attested as the appropriate 
model required to explore the interconnectivity 
amid variables. However, the R-squared stands 
as at 48%, implying the degree of functionality 
amidst the explanatory construct on the explained 
construct. Furthermore, a holistic fitness amidst 
variables interaction is evident by the Fisher ratio 
p-value of 0.00002.
However, the first hypothesis states that there is 
no significant relationship between board skill 
and cash holding decisions in listed manufactur-
ing firms in Nigeria. This proposition aligns with 
the claim, but statistically insignificant as evident 
Table 3. Correlation analysis
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018).
Variable CASH BSKILL FL FD DOWN DCOM BSIZE LEV PROF
CASH
1.000000 – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – –
BSKILL
0.058951 1.000000 – – – – – – –
0.711103 – – – – – – – –
0.4782 – – – – – – – –
GD
–0.15738 –0.28412 1.000000 – – – – – –
–1.91901 –3.56828 – – – – – – –
0.0569 0.0005 – – – – – – –
FD
–0.15315 –0.22724 0.126919 1.000000 – – – – –
–1.86620 –2.80979 1.540768 – – – – – –
0.0640 0.0056 0.1256 – – – – – –
DOWN
–0.00580 0.258453 –0.02249 –0.08312 1.000000 – – – –
–0.06985 3.221645 –0.27090 –1.00442 – – – – –
0.5444 0.0016 0.5869 0.3169 – – – – –
DCOM
0.052346 –0.27738 0.070243 –0.04068 –0.14145 1.000000 – – –
0.631197 –3.47657 0.847929 –0.49028 –1.72066 – – – –
0.5289 0.0007 0.3979 0.6247 0.0874 – –– –
BSIZE
–0.10056 0.150213 –0.31607 –0.08223 –0.03039 0.456981 1.000000 – –
–1.21712 1.829559 –4.01129 –0.99348 –0.36614 6.186530 – – –
0.2255 0.0694 0.0001 0.3221 0.7148 0.0000 – – –
LEV
–0.00595 –0.08629 0.141712 0.087762 0.094639 0.265228 0.007910 1.000000 –
–0.07165 –1.04296 1.723832 1.060885 1.144747 3.312404 0.095251 – –
0.5430 0.2987 0.0869 0.2905 0.2542 0.0012 0.5242 – –
PROF
0.048511 –0.03851 0.007402 0.134490 –0.08160 0.014605 –0.01357 –0.039038 1.000000
0.584838 –0.46409 0.089133 1.634319 –0.98592 0.175892 –0.16339 –0.47044 –
0.5596 0.6433 0.5291 0.1044 0.3258 0.6606 0.5704 0.6387 –
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by the t-statistics and p-values of –0.30 and 0.76, 
respectively. This implies that the top level man-
agement skill level of qualification is not a major 
fulcrum for making cash holding decisions with-
in an organization. Thus, the finding is akin to 
the work of Jamil, Anwar, Afzaal, Tariq, and Asif 
(2016) who averred that well-structured cash sys-
tem is not mainly influenced by board skill.
Furthermore, the second assumption states that 
there is no significant association between female 
leadership and cash holding decisions in listed 
manufacturing firms in Nigeria. This does not 
align with the findings as shown in Table 5 with 
a t-statistics and p-values of –2.46 and 0.01 clear-
ly depicting an adverse and significant association 
exist amid female leadership and cash holding de-
cision. This outcome resonates with the work of 
averse (Ahsan & Ullah, 2013) who averred that 
men are more confident in decision making than 
women and board lead by female directors do not 
make risky investment because of her risk appetite, 
there is no need for cash holding and that a nega-
tive relationship exists between female leadership 
and cash holding decision (Alam, 2010; Sabbadini 
& Lim, 2011).
Consequently, the third hypothesis stands as fol-
lows: there is no significant relationship between 
foreign directors and cash holding decisions in 
listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The result 
as contained in (Table 5) reveals otherwise by the 
t-statistics and p-values of 0.67 and 0.02, respec-
tively. The outcome suggests an optimistic and 
significant association existing amid foreign di-
rectors and cash reserves. Implying an adequate 
proportion of foreign directors on top hierarchic 
in making decisions would transcend to a success-
ful harnessing of ideas required to ascertain en-
sure the optimal cash reserves. 
The fourth assumption stands as follows: there is 
no significant association between board owner-
ship and cash holding decisions in listed manufac-
turing firms in Nigeria. The result as contained in 
Table 5 reveals the t-statistics and p-values of 0.62 
and 0.54 does consonance with the null hypothe-
sis. It clearly suggests that directors holding moves 
in the same direction with cash reserves, but such 
association is insignificant. This outcome is akin 
to the work of Kuan et al. (2011), Jamil, Anwar, 
Afzaal, Tariq, and Asif (2016) who averred that di-
rectors stakes in a firm would guide their instincts 
to pursue activities that would maximize the over-
all objective of the firm (Al-Najjar & Clark, 2017; 
Amess et al., 2015).
Finally, the last hypothesis holds that there is no 
significant association between director com-
pensation and cash holding decisions in listed 
manufacturing firms in Nigeria. This statement 
conforms with the outcome as displayed in Table 
Table 5. Panel regression analysis
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
BSKILL –0.009017 0.029634 –0.304278 0.7615
FL –0.209297 0.084788 –2.468483 0.0151
FOREPT 0.069554 0.103751 0.670391 0.0240
DOWN 0.034013 0.054778 0.620929 0.5359
DCOM –0.014201 0.021679 –0.655036 0.5138
BSIZE –0.007196 0.006539 –1.100483 0.2734
LEV –0.002448 0.068284 –0.035843 0.9715
PROF –0.022303 0.091911 –0.242654 0.8087
C 0.311865 0.194196 1.605926 0.1111
Effects specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.481067 Mean dependent var 0.099414
Adjusted R-squared 0.335401 S.D. dependent var 0.104828
S.E. of regression 0.085459 Akaike info criterion –1.886825
Sum squared resid 0.832560 Schwarz criterion –1.215504
F-statistic 3.302542 Durbin-Watson stat 2.226693
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000002
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5 showing the t-statistics and p-values of –0.65 
and 0.51, however, these findings are insignifi-
cant, implying that an adverse association ex-
ist amidst the director compensation and cash 
reserves. This outcome corroborates the work 
of Kuan et al. (2011) who averred that excess 
director compensation can result in underper-
formance of firms.
CONCLUSION
Cash holding decision is a very sensitive decision-making process of a firm, such decision helps in ascer-
taining the level of cash adequacy, check firms overtrading and stock of idle cash within its operations. 
The peculiar nature of this case necessitated an investigation on the implication of corporate dynamism 
on cash holding decision in thirty listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria spanning six years from 2012 
to 2017. Findings from this study stand that foreign directors, director compensation and directors 
holding all have a positive association with cash holding decision. However, the director compensation 
is insignificant. On the other hand, board skill and gender diversity both have an adverse effect on the 
cash holding decision. The study, therefore, concludes that the decision to hold cash could be triggered 
by directors’ holdings and foreign directors, because when they have stakes in any establishment, it 
triggers their aggressiveness toward engaging in an optimal and profitable operation that would boost 
their stakes (wealth). Also, foreign directors tend to exert some sort of expertise, which in turn rubs off 
on cash holding decisions, which can be justified due to the wider exposure they have as regards expe-
rience gathered from different parts of the world. The paper recommends that an appropriate policy on 
board mix inspired by core competence and parties having stakes in the company would help provide 
constructive ideas on the effective and efficient fund management within the manufacturing industries 
in Nigeria.
This study is limited by the fact that the data used for this work were generated from listed non-financial 
(industrial and consumable goods) sectors in Nigerian Stock Exchange. This will, in essence, limit the 
generalization of our findings over other sectors. However, the finding from this study remains valid. 
Future researchers can explore the financial sector, explore the comparative analysis amidst sectors on 
the subject matter.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Random effect regression analysis
Dependent variable: CASH
Method: panel EGLS (cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/17/18 Time: 02:12
Sample: 2012–2017
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 25
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 147
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
BSKILL 1.93E–05 0.023249 0.000831 0.9993
FL –0.173029 0.071949 –2.404885 0.0175
FOREPT –0.029348 0.070722 –0.414980 0.6788
DIRECTOR_OWNERSHIP 0.016555 0.043834 0.377682 0.7062
D_COM 0.009763 0.015219 0.641494 0.5223
BSIZE –0.007420 0.004577 –1.621155 0.1073
LEVERAGE –0.002702 0.055719 –0.048495 0.9614
PROFITABILITY 0.002774 0.083192 0.033345 0.9734
C 0.146457 0.121821 1.202229 0.2313
Effects specification
S.D. Rho
Cross-section random 0.063868 0.3584
Idiosyncratic random 0.085459 0.6416
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.551136 Mean dependent var 0.047897
Adjusted R-squared 0.355211 S.D. dependent var 0.084995
S.E. of regression 0.085038 Sum squared resid 0.997932
F-statistic 1.006595 Durbin-Watson stat 1.939361
Prob (F-statistic) 0.043969
Unweighted statistics
R-squared 0.077046 Mean dependent var 0.099414
Sum squared resid 1.480758 Durbin-Watson stat 1.307000
